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Abstract 
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alternative. We show that the members’ concern for each other’s motivation leads to a lack of 
communication, resulting in a failure to adapt (i.e. the status quo is maintained even when evidence for 
the alternative’s superiority has been observed). Adaptation failures are particularly severe when 
production exhibits strong complementarities. Improving the organization’s aggregate information has 
the adverse effect of reducing communication. In the long run, the organization can become “locked-in” 
with the status quo, in that adaptation is impaired for every adoptable alternative. 
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1 Introduction
Adaptation has long been recognized as a prerequisite for economic performance in en-
vironments subject to change. Economists have argued that adaptation is vital for both
individual decision makers in market settings (Hayek, 1945), and for hierarchical orga-
nizations (Barnard, 1938). The importance of adaptation for an organization’s success
becomes most apparent when dominant firms fail to sustain their position in the event
of radical change. Henderson (1993) and Christensen (2013) document examples from
various industries where previously successful organizations proved unable to adopt tech-
nological innovations, in spite of their members’ awareness of the need for change.
Organizations structured around teamwork are widely regarded as more able to adapt.
This view is shared amongst organizational psychologists, practitioners, and management
scientists. For example, Burke et al. (2006) state that “structuring work via teams rather
than around individuals primes organizations to be more adaptive because collectives have
a broader repertoire of experiences to draw on.” This view may explain why work teams
have become an integral part of most organizations (Manz and Sims, 1993).
In this paper we argue that teamwork need not necessarily be associated with the
ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Our argument is based on the observation that
the mere nature of team production creates an incentive for its members to communicate
strategically. In particular, team members may withhold information that reduces their
colleagues’ motivation to implement a common decision. We show that due to the resulting
lack of communication, teams fail to adapt in situations where individual decision makers
would choose the right course of action. Hence, while it is true that teams have more
opinions to draw on, the nature of team production itself may obstruct these opinions
from contributing to the decision-making process.
We analyze a standard model of team production preceded by a project-selection stage
in which the team chooses between a status quo project A and an alternative project B.
The alternative belongs to the team’s adaptation set B, containing all projects that are
ex ante inferior relative to the status quo but constitute the better choice conditional
on the occurrence of an event E. The event E is assumed to represent bad news with
respect to the status quo. Each team member may privately obtain verifiable evidence
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about the occurrence of E and would adopt the alternative individually whenever he
obtained such evidence. The team chooses a common project after its members had an
opportunity to communicate their private information. In this paper, we are concerned
with the members’ willingness to disclose evidence and the implications for the team’s
ability to adopt the superior project.
In our model, team members face a trade-off between adaptation and motivation.
The disclosure of evidence for E leads to the adoption of the better project B whereas its
concealment makes uninformed team members more motivated to exert effort on project
A. This is because the absence of news is interpreted as good news with respect to the
status quo. We show that this trade-off implies the existence of a non-empty subset BI ⊂ B
of projects for which adaptation is impaired, in the sense that they fail to be adopted
(with positive probability) even when evidence for their superiority has been obtained (by
some member). Comparing team production with individualistic production, we find that
teams are more adaptive if and only if the value of adaptation is sufficiently high relative
to the value of motivation.
We further show that team adaptation failures may be most severe in those situations
where team production is most frequently employed. In particular, we provide an example
of a technology where the set of projects for which adaptation is impaired grows with the
degree of complementarity of team production. Moreover, improving the team’s aggregate
information by increasing the likelihood with which evidence is obtained individually has
the adverse effect of reducing communication. Hence the ability to adapt may be lower
when the team is better-informed.
We then embed our basic model into a dynamic framework in order to study how the
trade-off between adaptation and motivation evolves over time. An important feature
of the dynamic setting is that the team members’ motivation to work on the status quo
increases with the number of periods in which no evidence for E has been observed.
We obtain the strong result that for sufficiently long time horizons team adaptation is
impaired for every adoptable project, i.e. BI = B, as long as the likelihood with which
E is expected to occur ex ante is sufficiently high. Hence there exists the possibility
that, in the long run, teams can become “locked-in” with the status quo in the sense that
there exists no project that will be adopted (with certainty) upon the observation of its
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superiority.
As a robustness check we consider a variation of our model in which team members
receive non-verifiable signals rather than verifiable evidence about the occurrence of the
event E. Although the team members’ incentives for truthful communication are strength-
ened by a propensity to agree that is absent in the model with evidence, our result about
the team’s inability to adapt remains intact.
Related literature
This paper contributes to a growing literature studying the influence of strategic or im-
perfect communication on decision making within organizations and its consequences for
organizational design.1 Few papers in this literature share our focus on adaptation. For
example, Dessein and Santos (2006) consider an organization consisting of individual
decision-makers who aim to adapt their actions to their localized information and to
coordinate them with the actions of others. Assuming communication to be imperfect,
Dessein and Santos show that there exists a trade-off between adaptation and coordina-
tion and study its impact on the organization’s degree of specialization. Their finding that
“extensive specialization results in organizations that ignore local knowledge” resonates
well with the view that team-work improves an organization’s adaptiveness. The trade-off
between adaptation and coordination is also present in Alonso et al. (2008, 2015) and
Rantakari (2008) who consider the influence of strategic communication for an organi-
zation’s choice between centralized and decentralized decision-making. We differ from
these models mainly in that decisions are taken by a group rather than by individuals
and that the trade-off is between adaptation and motivation rather than adaptation and
coordination.
The trade-off between adaptation and motivation has been a feature of other models
but existing work has focused on hierarchical settings where decision-making and execu-
tion are the task of separate agents (Zabojnik (2002), Blanes i Vidal and Mo¨ller (2007),
Landier et al. (2009)). An exception is Blanes i Vidal and Mo¨ller (2016) where we used
a similar but drastically simplified model (binary efforts, no complementarities, homoge-
neous team members) to show that a team’s failure to adapt cannot be overcome even
1See Gibbons, Matouschek and Roberts (2013) for a recent review.
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when it is able to commit to the most sophisticated mechanisms.2 Here we take a com-
plementary approach by assuming that such commitment is not available. This is in line
with the view advocated by organizational economists that “if too much is contractible,
then the transaction should probably be conducted in a market rather than in an orga-
nization” (Gibbons, Matouschek and Roberts (2013)). Both approaches share the basic
insight that motivation hinders adaptation but allow for complementary sets of results.
Our finding that information aggregation can be inefficient arises in a number of
articles on group decision-making but for different reasons: Conflicting preferences (Li,
Rosen, and Suen, 2001; Dessein 2007); Career concerns (Ottaviani and Sorensen, 2001;
Levy, 2007; Visser and Swank, 2007); and Voting (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1998;
Gersbach 2000). Moreover, in this literature effort typically refers to the acquisition
of decision-relevant information (Persico 2004, Gerardi and Yariv 2007, Gershkov and
Szentes 2009, Campbell et al. 2013), rather than the execution of a joint decision. Our
model offers an alternative explanation for information aggregation failures by highlighting
the consequences of a group’s desire to maintain high morale at the execution stage, for the
communication of information at the decision-making stage, thereby formalizing, partly,
the notion of “Groupthink” coined by Janis (1982).3
More generally, our paper contributes to the literature on teams which can be decom-
posed into two distinct branches. The first branch dates back to Marshak and Radner
(1972) and has become known as team theory. It is concerned with the analysis of team
decision-making when members share a common objective but differ in their information.
The second branch, initiated by Holmstrom’s (1982) analysis of moral hazard in teams,
deals with the question of how to provide team members with incentives to exert effort.
While team theory abstracts from the execution of a group’s decision, incentive theory
has nothing to say about decision making. Our paper lies at the intersection of these two
approaches by considering a team whose members take and execute a joint decision.
2Another exception is Banal-Estan˜ol and Seldeslachts (2009), who study mergers and show that the
concern for the partner’s post-merger effort may hinder decision-making at the pre-merger stage.
3Benabou (2013) also emphasizes the importance of group-morale, but does so in a very different model
where individuals decide whether to engage in “reality denial” about an exogenously given productivity
parameter.
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2 Model
We model an organization as a team consisting of two risk-neutral members indexed by
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j.4 Members exert non-contractible efforts to implement a common
project. In particular, member i chooses effort ei ≥ 0 at cost Ci(ei). Costs are assumed
to be increasing and strictly convex with limei→0
dCi
dei
= 0 and limei→∞
dCi
dei
= ∞ . The
team’s revenue depends on efforts and the quality, q > 0, of the underlying project. It
is given by q · F (e1, e2) with F being an increasing and concave function.
5 We focus on
the case where efforts are complements, i.e. member i’s marginal return to effort, ∂F
∂ei
, is
assumed to be (weakly) increasing in the effort provided by member j.6
There are two mutually exclusive projects, X ∈ {A,B}, whose qualities are uncertain.
For example, A may represent a firm’s strategy of exploiting its dominant position in
the industry by focusing on the sale of its traditional product whereas B may consist of
the development of a new technology. Let qX|E and qX|E¯ denote the expected qualities
of project X conditional on an event having occurred (E) or not having occurred (E¯)
respectively. We let ρ0 ∈ (0, 1) be the probability that E occurs and assume, without loss
of generality, that ex ante project A is expected to have a higher quality than project B,
i.e.
ρ0qA|E + (1− ρ0)qA|E¯ > ρ0qB|E + (1− ρ0)qB|E¯ . (C1)
Accordingly, we denote project A as the status quo. We further assume that E represents
negative news with respect to the status quo, i.e.
qA|E < qA|E¯, (C2)
and that conditional on E having occurred, project B is expected to be of higher quality
than project A, i.e.
qB|E > qA|E . (C3)
For example, E could be a first step in the development of a new technology taken by a
competitor, threatening the profits obtainable from the sale of existing products. Figure
4Our results can be easily generalized to a team with more than two members.
5The multiplicative functional form simplifies the exposition but is not necessary. Our results are a
consequence of the fact that marginal returns to effort are increasing in the project’s quality.
6The existence of complementarities is commonly considered as a motive for team production.
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Figure 1: The team’s adaptation set B for a given prior ρ0 and status quo A = (qA|E¯, qA|E)
satisfying (C2). B contains all projects whose quality is expected to be lower than the
status quo’s ex ante (C1) but higher conditional on the event E being realized (C3).
1 provides a summary of our assumptions with respect to the projects’ qualities. Given a
status quo A satisfying (C2), the area B depicts the set of alternative projects B whose
state dependent quality (qB|E¯ , qB|E) satisfies the conditions (C1) and (C3). We refer to
B as the team’s adaptation set. B contains all those projects which are ex ante inferior
with respect to the status quo but constitute superior choices conditional on the event E
having occurred.
Team members may obtain private information concerning the occurrence of event E.
We model this by assuming that, conditional on E having occurred, member i obtains
verifiable evidence of E’s occurrence with probability γi ∈ (0, 1).
7 However, it is not
7The assumption that information is verifiable has a long tradition in information economics, start-
ing with the seminal work of Milgrom (1981). It guarantees that members cannot misrepresent their
information. The fact that information is either perfect or absent simplifies Bayesian updating. In Sec-
tion 6 we consider a variation of our model in which team members receive non-verifiable and imperfect
information.
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possible to obtain evidence proving that E has not occurred.8 For example, if a new tech-
nology has been developed by a competitor, a sample device might be obtainable whereas
otherwise no such sample exists. We will be concerned with the members’ incentive to
disclose their evidence and the implications for the team’s ability to adapt to the event
E by adopting the superior project B.
In Blanes i Vidal and Mo¨ller (2016) we have determined the optimal institution for
a team in a simplified setting by assuming that members can commit to a mechanism
which selects a project and allocates revenue based on the disclosed information. Here
we pursue a complementary approach by assuming that the team is unable to commit
to such a mechanism. Instead, we posit that member i obtains a fixed share αi > 0 of
revenue and that the team’s project choice must be optimal ex post, i.e. conditional on
the disclosed evidence.9 This allows us to investigate communication and its influence on
adaptation in a type of organizational framework that is frequently observed in reality.
The timing is as follows: (I) Nature determines whether the event E occurs and for
each member whether he obtains evidence for E. (II) Each member who obtained evidence
may either disclose it or conceal it. (III) Based on the disclosed information, the team
select the project with the highest (expected) quality. In particular, the status quo is
maintained unless evidence for E has been disclosed. (IV) Finally, members choose their
efforts.10 Member i’s payoff when a project of quality q was selected and efforts (e1, e2)
were exerted is given by
Ui(e1, e2, q) = αiqF (e1, e2)− Ci(ei). (1)
A strategy for member i specifies the probability di ∈ [0, 1] with which he discloses
evidence and a rule determining his effort as a function of the selected project and the
information available to him.
8This assumption simplifies the exposition but is not necessary for our results, as members would have
no incentive to conceal evidence that is favorable with respect to the status quo.
9Note that we do not require budget balance, i.e. α1 +α2 may be less than one. Also note that an ex
post optimal project choice would be the result of any voting procedure taking place after members had
an opportunity to share their private information.
10We assume that efforts are chosen simultaneously since otherwise one member may obtain information
about the project’s quality from his observation of the other member’s effort as in the leadership model
by Hermalin (1998).
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In the following section we explain why communication is strategic in our model and
show that the amount of information that is disclosed in equilibrium can be characterized
as a function of a single parameter
∆q ≡ qB|E − qA|E. (2)
The parameter ∆q measures the gain in project quality from abandoning the status quo
A in exchange for the alternative project B in the presence of evidence proving B’s
superiority. We denote this parameter as the value of adaptation.
3 Communication
To understand the strategic nature of communication in our setup it is instructive to
consider the possibility of an equilibrium in which both team members disclose their
information fully, i.e. d1 = d2 = 1. Suppose that member i ∈ {1, 2} observed evidence
that E occurred. If member i discloses his evidence then project B is selected and both
members expect the project’s quality to be qB|E . Equilibrium efforts (eˆ
E,E
1 , eˆ
E,E
2 ) are thus
defined by the requirement that eˆE,Ek solves
max
ek
αkqB|EF (ek, eˆ
E,E
l )− Ck(ek) (3)
for k, l ∈ {1, 2}, k 6= l.11 Here we use the superscript (E,E) to express the fact that
both members know about the occurrence of event E. Member i’s expected payoff from
disclosing his evidence is given by Ui(eˆ
E,E
1 , eˆ
E,E
2 , qB|E).
If, instead, member i conceals his evidence then two possibilities arise. The first
possibility is that member j has also received evidence and discloses it in accordance with
his strategy of full disclosure. In this case the concealment of evidence by member i has
no effect on member i’s payoff. The second possibility is that member j has failed to
receive evidence. In this case, project A is selected and member j is induced to believe
11Since efforts are complementary, the simultaneous effort choice constitutes a supermodular game.
Milgrom and Roberts (1990) have shown that a supermodular game has a smallest and a largest pure
Nash equilibrium. Since revenue is increasing in efforts, the largest equilibrium is Pareto preferred to all
other equilibria. We assume that members are able to coordinate on their preferred equilibrium thereby
selecting the largest equilibrium as the unique outcome of the simultaneous effort choice game.
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that no evidence has been observed. Member j therefore updates his belief about the
likelihood of the occurrence of event E to
ρ1 =
ρ0(1− γ1)(1− γ2)
ρ0(1− γ1)(1− γ2) + 1− ρ0
. (4)
Note for future reference that no news represents good news for the status quo, i.e. ρ1 < ρ0
implying ρ1qA|E + (1− ρ1)qA|E¯ > ρ0qA|E + (1− ρ0)qA|E¯. This property will play a role for
the evolution of adaptation over time in the dynamic extension of our model in Section 5.
Member j presumes (wrongly) that member i shares his updated belief and thus
chooses the effort level eˆ∅,∅j forming part of the equilibrium effort vector (eˆ
∅,∅
1 , eˆ
∅,∅
2 ) that
would occur if both members had failed to observe evidence. (eˆ∅,∅1 , eˆ
∅,∅
2 ) is defined by the
requirement that eˆ∅,∅k solves
max
ek
αk[ρ1qA|E + (1− ρ1)qA|E¯]F (ek, eˆ
∅,∅
l )− Ck(ek) (5)
for k, l ∈ {1, 2}, k 6= l. Since the deviating member i has observed evidence for the event
E, he expects project A’s quality to be given by qA|E and therefore chooses a best reply
to member j’s effort level eˆ∅,∅j by selecting the effort eˆ
E,∅
i that solves
max
ei
αiqA|EF (ei, eˆ
∅,∅
j )− Ci(ei). (6)
The superscript (E, ∅) denotes the fact that member i knows that E has occurred whereas
member j believes that no evidence has been observed. The disclosure of evidence is
optimal for member i if and only if
∆Ui ≡ Ui(eˆ
E,E
i , eˆ
E,E
j , qB|E)− Ui(eˆ
E,∅
i , eˆ
∅,∅
j , qA|E) ≥ 0. (7)
Condition (7) highlights the team members’ trade-off between adaptation and motivation.
On the one hand, disclosure leads to an increase in project quality due to the positive
value ∆q = qB|E − qA|E of adopting the superior project. On the other hand, disclosure
leads to a change in member j’s effort from eˆ∅,∅j to eˆ
E,E
j . Disclosure decreases member j’s
motivation to exert effort when project B’s expected quality conditional on the occurrence
of event E is smaller than the quality project A is expected to have in the absence of
evidence, i.e. qB|E < ρ1qA|E + (1− ρ1)qA|E¯. We depict these two effects in Figure 2. The
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Figure 2: The basic trade-off. Disclosure of E induces the adoption of the superior project
B with quality qB|E > qA|E. Concealment motivates uninformed members to exert higher
effort as they expect project A to offer higher quality ρ1qA|E + (1− ρ1)qA|E¯ > qB|E .
downward pointing arrow of length ∆q is a measure of the adaptation effect. Similarly,
the upward pointing arrow of length ρ1qA|E + (1 − ρ1)qA|E¯ − qB|E is a measure of the
motivation effect. The team members’ incentive to disclose information depends on the
size of the adaptation effect relative to the motivation effect.
While (7) provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a full dis-
closure equilibrium, deriving the corresponding conditions for an equilibrium in which
evidence is concealed (with positive probability) is more complicated. This is due to the
fact that in such an equilibrium the simultaneous effort choice in the absence of evidence
constitutes a Bayesian game in which members do not know whether or not their colleague
has observed (and concealed) evidence. We have relegated the corresponding analysis to
the Appendix where we prove the following result:
Proposition 1 There exist thresholds ∆qC and ∆qD such that 0 < ∆qC < ∆qD and the
following holds:
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1. Full disclosure of evidence, d1 = d2 = 1, is an equilibrium if and only if ∆q ≥ ∆q
D.
2. Full concealment of evidence, d1 = d2 = 0, is an equilibrium if and only if ∆q ≤ ∆q
C.
3. For ∆q ∈ (∆qC ,∆qD), disclosure is partial, (0, 0) 6= (d1, d2) 6= (1, 1), and (weakly)
increasing in ∆q, i.e. if (d1, d2) and (d
′
1, d
′
2) are equilibria for ∆q and ∆q
′ respectively
then (d′1, d
′
2) > (d1, d2) implies ∆q
′ > ∆q.
Proposition 1 provides a complete characterization of the communication equilibria of our
model. One way to summarize the result is the observation that team communication
deteriorates (monotonically) as the value of adaptation decreases. In the following section
we state the implications for the team’s ability to adapt and consider how team adaptation
depends on the team’s characteristics.
4 Team adaptation
Our model assumes that production is organized in form of a team. Given individual
efforts e1 and e2, team members obtain a joint output qF (e1, e2). Suppose that, alterna-
tively, production can be organized individualistically. That is, assume that the individ-
ual efforts e1 and e2 result in the outputs q1F1(e1) and q2F2(e2) when individuals work
separately. Team production then differs from individualistic production in that team
members are able to communicate and hence share their information and in that mem-
bers work on the same project (with common quality q) rather than on two potentially
different projects (with qualities q1 and q2).
A natural question to ask is whether team production is more or less adaptive than
individualistic production.12 Under individualistic production, the probability that in-
dividual i allocates his effort to the best project is given by ρ0 + (1 − ρ0)γi. In par-
ticular, conditional on the event E having occurred, individual i chooses to work on
project B only if he observed evidence for E. In contrast, under team production
12Ultimately one should be interested in whether team production is more or less efficient than indi-
vidualistic production. However, the answer to this question depends crucially on the relation between
F1(e1) + F2(e2) and F (e1, e2). Generally, team production will be more efficient than individualistic
production when effort-complementarities are sufficiently strong.
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the probability that individual i allocates his effort to the best project is given by
ρ0 + (1− ρ0)[d1γ1(1− γ2) + d2γ2(1− γ1) + d1γ1d2γ2]. Conditional on the event E having
occurred, team adaptation requires that evidence has been observed and disclosed by
some team member
In this framework, the common perception that teams are more adaptive finds its
expression in the fact that, when full disclosure (d1 = d2 = 1) is an equilibrium, the
likelihood that efforts are allocated to the best project is higher under team production
than under individualistic production, i.e. ρ0 + (1− ρ0)(γ1+ γ2+ γ1γ2) > ρ0 + (1− ρ0)γi.
However, note that when full concealment (d1 = d2 = 0) is an equilibrium, then team
production is less adaptive than individualistic production, i.e. ρ0 < ρ0 + (1 − ρ0)γi.
It is easy to see that an improvement of communication in the form of an increase in
(d1, d2) makes team production more adaptive. Hence the following is a straightforward
implication of our characterization of team communication in the previous section:
Corollary 1 Team production is more adaptive than individualistic production if and
only if the value of adaptation is sufficiently high.
The downside of team production, which is the focus of this paper, is that communication
is guided not only by adaptational but also motivational concerns. Even though team
members have a common preference for the project with the highest quality, motivational
concerns may obstruct communication resulting in team adaptation being impaired.13 To
be precise about this point, we make the following definition:
Definition 1 Team adaptation is said to be impaired for an adoptable project B ∈ B,
if conditional on evidence for B’s superiority having been obtained by some member, the
team maintains the status quo A with positive probability.
With this definition, the following corollary is a simple summary of the implications of
the team communication failures characterized in Proposition 1:
13It is worth emphasizing that, in contrast to Li et al. (2001), in our model there never exists disagree-
ment at the project selection stage. When no evidence was disclosed even those members who concealed
evidence are in favor of selecting the status quo.
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Corollary 2 The team’s adaptation set B contains a non-empty subset BI ⊂ B of projects
for which team adaptation is impaired:
BI = {B ∈ B|∆q < ∆qD}. (8)
In the remainder of this section we will characterize the conditions under which adaptation
failures are most likely to occur by considering the determinants of the set BI .
Technology
Besides information sharing, the main argument in favor of team production is the ex-
istence of effort-complementarities. It is therefore important to understand how team
adaptation depends on the level of complementarity. In particular, one may hope that
adaptation failures are less likely in settings with strong complementarities where team
production is most frequently employed. Unfortunately, we have not been able to charac-
terize the dependence of the set BI on the level of complementarity for general production
and effort-cost functions. However, our next result provides an example which shows that
adaptation failures might be particularly severe in those settings where team production
is most likely to emerge:
Proposition 2 Let F (e1, e2) = e1 + e2 + ηe1e2 with η > 0, Ci(ei) =
1
4
e2i , and αi =
1
2
.
The team’s ability to adapt is decreasing in the complementarity of team production, i.e.
η′ > η implies BI(η) ⊂ BI(η′).
Proposition 2 shows that an increase in the complementarity of team production leads
to an expansion of the set of projects for which adaptation is impaired. This result
highlights the downside of choosing team production over individual production in settings
characterized by strong complementarities.
The intuition for the result is as follows. Stronger complementarities lead to an increase
in the uninformed member’s effort both after the concealment as well as the disclosure of
evidence. However, since the uninformed member j expects member i to exert a higher
effort upon concealment than upon disclosure, eˆ∅,∅j increases more strongly than eˆ
E,E
j . As
a consequence member i’s incentive to conceal evidence increases. Since this intuition
holds quite generally, we expect our result to extend beyond the specific functional form
assumed in Proposition 2.
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Information
If team adaptation is obstructed by the members’ failure to share information, a potential
remedy might be to improve the information of each individual member. Indeed, an
increase in member i’s individual informedness γi makes the team become more likely to
obtain evidence on aggregate. In particular, the team’s aggregate informedness
Γ ≡ 1− (1− γ1)(1− γ2) (9)
increases. A team with access to better information has a greater potential to adopt the
right course of action. However, the following result shows that there exists an adverse
effect.
Proposition 3 The set of projects for which adaptation is impaired is increasing in the
team’s aggregate informedness, i.e. Γ′ > Γ implies BI(Γ) ⊂ BI(Γ′).
To understand this result, first note from (4) that an increase in the team’s aggregate
informedness, Γ, lowers the probability ρ1 with which uninformed members believe that
E has occurred when no evidence is being disclosed. Intuitively, for a higher Γ, the
absence of evidence for E represents more positive news with respect to the status quo.
As a consequence, team members are willing to exert higher efforts on the status quo in
the absence of evidence, giving members a stronger incentive to conceal information. This
leads to an expansion of the set of projects for which adaptation is impaired.
5 Adaptation in the long run
Our analysis so far has shown that, in a general team framework, a team’s ability to
adapt to news in conflict with the status quo is sub-optimal, and that this problem is
particularly severe when production exhibits strong complementarities and the team is
regarded as well informed on aggregate. In this section we use a dynamic extension of
our model to show that in the long run adaptation failures can become generic (in a sense
to be made precise below). Our model formalizes the notion that a team may become
“locked-in” with the status quo and sheds light on the conditions under which this is most
likely to happen.
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We extend our baseline model by assuming that there exist T > 1 adaptation periods.
Whether or not the event E occurs is determined at time t = 0. In each period t ∈
{1, 2, . . . , T}, team members face the same situation as in the baseline model described
in Section 2. In particular, conditional on E having occurred, member i obtains evidence
for E’s occurrence with probability γi, chooses whether to disclose or conceal, and exerts
(unobservable) effort ei,t on the selected project Xt ∈ {A,B}. We abstract from the
possibility that members learn about their project’s quality qXt from their colleague’s
previous efforts or the realization of revenue by assuming that efforts are unobservable
and that all revenue is realized at the end of period T . In the absence of discounting,
member i’s payoff is thus given by
UTi =
T∑
t=1
Ui(e1,t, e2,t, qXt) = αi
T∑
t=1
qXtF (e1,t, e2,t)−
T∑
t=1
Ci(ei,t). (10)
An important property of the dynamic setting is that the members’ beliefs about the oc-
currence of the event E and hence their expectations about the status quo’s quality evolve
over time. More specifically, in period t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T} of a full disclosure equilibrium,
the members’ belief about the likelihood of E in the absence of evidence is determined
recursively by
ρt =
ρt−1(1− γ1)(1− γ2)
ρt−1(1− γ1)(1− γ2) + 1− ρt−1
. (11)
Note that ρt < ρt−1, i.e. the members’ expectations about the status quo’s quality
increases in the number of periods during which no evidence for the occurrence of E has
been obtained.14
As before we are concerned with the influence of the privacy of information on the
team’s ability to adapt. If evidence was observed publicly, then in the dynamic setting,
the team would adopt the alternative as soon as it obtained evidence of its superiority.
Hence our notion of impaired adaptation given in Definition 1 extends to the dynamic
setting. As in the static setting, the full disclosure of evidence is necessary to prevent
adaptation from being impaired.
14A sufficient condition for this property to hold is that team members are more likely to obtain
evidence for the occurrence than for the non-occurrence of the event E.
16
In order to determine the conditions under which full disclosure constitutes an equilib-
rium in the dynamic setting, suppose that both members’ strategies call for full disclosure
in every period. Consider member i’s incentive to conceal evidence in period τ when no
evidence has been disclosed in periods 1, . . . , τ − 1. If member i discloses evidence then
from period τ onwards, the team will work on project B and members will exert efforts
eˆE,Ei as defined by (3) in Section 4. If member i conceals his evidence in period τ (and ever
after) then what happens in period t ≥ τ depends on whether or not member j obtains
evidence himself in periods τ, . . . , t. Concealment by member i in period τ has an effect
on payoffs in period t ≥ τ only when member j fails to observe evidence in periods τ . . . t.
This happens with probability (1 − γj)
t−τ+1. Member i will therefore prefer disclosure
over concealment in period τ if and only if
T∑
t=τ
(1− γj)
t−τ+1[Ui(eˆ
E,E
i , eˆ
E,E
j , qB|E)− Ui(eˆ
E,∅
i,t , eˆ
∅,∅
j,t , qA|E)] ≥ 0. (12)
The effort levels eˆE,∅i,t and eˆ
∅,∅
j,t are determined as in Section 4 from (5) and (6) with ρt
playing the role of the updated prior.
Since the members’ expectation of the status quo’s quality is increasing over time, the
effort member j is willing to exert on the status quo in the absence of evidence, eˆ∅,∅j,t , is
increasing from period to period. It follows that member i’s incentive to disclose evidence
is decreasing over time, i.e. (12) holds for all τ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T} if and only if it holds for
τ = T . Hence full disclosure constitutes an equilibrium of the dynamic setting if and only
if
∆UTi ≡ Ui(eˆ
E,E
i , eˆ
E,E
j , qB|E)− Ui(eˆ
E,∅
i,T , eˆ
∅,∅
j,T , qA|E) ≥ 0. (13)
Letting BI(T ) denote the set of alternatives for which adaptation is impaired with a
horizon of length T , we obtain the following result:
Proposition 4 Suppose there are T > 1 periods of adaptation and all revenue material-
izes at the end of the last period.
1. The set of projects for which team adaptation is impaired is growing with the time
horizon, i.e. T ′ > T implies BI(T ) ⊂ BI(T ′).
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2. If the event E is sufficiently likely, i.e. ρ0 > ρ¯0 ∈ (0, 1), then in the long run team
adaptation is impaired for every adoptable alternative, i.e. there exists a T¯ such
that BI(T ) = B for all T ≥ T¯ .
The first part of Proposition 4 is an immediate consequence of the fact that the team
members’ confidence in the status quo, and hence their motivation to exert effort in
the absence of evidence, is increasing over time. In order to guarantee full adaptation,
members must find it optimal to disclose evidence in favor of the alternative even when
their colleague has become maximally confident with respect to the superiority of the
status quo. A longer time horizon raises the maximum level of confidence team members
may obtain. Hence a larger value of adaptation ∆q is required to guarantee full disclosure
and adaptation.
Now consider what happens as T tends to infinity. When in a full disclosure equilib-
rium, no evidence has been disclosed for many periods, member j will eventually believe
that the event E must not have occurred, i.e. limT→∞ ρT = 0, and that this belief is
shared by member i. In the long run member j will therefore work on the status quo
as if it was common knowledge that its quality was qA|E¯ , exerting the effort eˆ
E¯,E¯
j where
(eˆE¯,E¯1 , eˆ
E¯,E¯
2 ) solves
max
ek
αkqA|E¯F (ek, eˆ
E¯,E¯
l )− Ck(ek). (14)
In the limit, a deviating member i, upon concealing his evidence, would choose a best
reply against eˆE¯,E¯j by selecting the effort eˆ
E,E¯
i solving
max
ei
αiqA|EF (ei, eˆ
E¯,E¯
j )− Ci(ei). (15)
As the team members’ incentive to disclose evidence is increasing in the value of adap-
tation, ∆q, the incentive to disclose is maximal for the alternative B = (qB|E¯ , qB|E) =
(0, qA|E +
1−ρ0
ρ0
qA|E¯) located in the upper left corner of the team’s adaptation set B (see
Figure 1). Hence, in the long run, adaptation must be impaired for every project B ∈ B
if and only if
∆U∞i ≡ Ui(eˆ
E,E
i , eˆ
E,E
j , qA|E +
1− ρ0
ρ0
qA|E¯)− Ui(eˆ
E,E¯
i , eˆ
E¯,E¯
j , qA|E) < 0 (16)
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for some member i ∈ {1, 2}. In the proof of Proposition 4 we show that this condition
holds if and only if ρ0 is above a certain threshold ρ¯0 ∈ (0, 1). If ρ0 > ρ¯0 then in the
long run, member j’s expectation of the status quo’s quality and hence his motivation to
exert effort increase by so much, that member i benefits from concealing evidence even
when the alternative was expected to have the same quality at time t = 0 and evidence
is maximally favorable with respect to the alternative in the sense that qB|E¯ = 0.
This last result formalizes the notion that organizations may become “locked-in” with
the status quo. To see this, consider a variation of our model in which the team faces a
(potentially) different project Bt ∈ B in each period. Recall that the team’s adaptation set
B contains all projects which are ex ante inferior relative to the status quo but constitute
superior choices conditional on the occurrence of the event E. Proposition 4 shows that
if E is sufficiently likely and the team has maintained the status quo for a sufficient
number of periods (either because no evidence for E was obtained or because evidence
was concealed) then in subsequent periods the team will fail to adapt (with positive
probability) any of the adoptable projects it may encounter.
6 Non-verifiable information
Although the assumptions about information have lent tractability to our model, we do
not pretend that they come without loss of generality. In particular, our model cannot
cover the notion that team members may be more motivated to work on a given project
when their “opinions” agree rather than disagree. In this section we consider a situation
where team members receive non-verifiable and imperfect information about the projects’
qualities. It turns out that the team’s inability to share information and the corresponding
adaptation failure continue to exist under these more standard assumptions.
Suppose that each member observes a private signal si ∈ {E, E¯} about the occurrence
of the event E. The signals’ precision is denoted as p ∈ (1
2
, 1), i.e.
p ≡ Prob(si = E|E) = Prob(si = E¯|E¯) (17)
for i ∈ {1, 2}. In order to simplify the algebra, we set qA|E = qB|E¯ = 0 and ρ0 = 1/2 and
assume that efforts are independent, i.e. F (e1, e2) = e1 + e2.
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In the communication stage (II), team members send non–verifiable messages mi ∈
{E, E¯} to each other. We maintain our assumption about the ex-post optimality of the
team’s project choice. In particular, in stage (III) the team selects the project X(mi, mj)
with the highest expected quality based on the communicated messages. We focus on the
case where ex-post optimality requires project B to be selected if and only if both members
observed signal E. In particular, we restrict attention to the area of the parameter space
where
(1− p)2
p2
qA|E¯ < qB|E < qA|E¯. (18)
In the following we explore the possibility of a truth-telling equilibrium in which each
member issues mi = si. For this purpose, let qX|si,sj denote project X ’s expected quality
conditional on the signals si and sj . If member i expects project X ’s quality to be given
by qX then he will exert effort eˆi(qX) =
dCi
dei
−1
(αiqX) on project X . If in a truth-telling
equilibrium signals (si, sj) have been observed and member i issues message mi then
member i’s expected payoff is given by
ui = αiqX(mi,sj)|si,sj [eˆi(qX(mi,sj)|si,sj) + eˆj(qX(mi,sj)|mi,sj)]− Ci(eˆi(qX(mi,sj)|si,sj)). (19)
When choosing his message, member i does not know whether sj = E¯ or sj = E. Member
j’s signal sj determines how member i’s message mi influences member j’s effort and
whether it alters the team’s project choice. For sj = E¯ the team will maintain the status
quo independently of member i’s message. However, member j will exert higher effort if
member i issues mi = E¯ since member j’s confidence in the status quo is reinforced when
messages agree. For sj = E the team will select the alternative project B if mi = E and
maintain the status if mi = E¯. Member j will exert more effort on the status quo than
on the alternative if and only if
qA|E¯ ·
1
2
> qB|E ·
q2
q2 + (1− q)2
. (20)
Hence for qB|E sufficiently small, team members have to compromise between maximizing
project quality by issuing mi = si and maximizing motivation by issuing mi = E¯. The
same trade-off that drives our results in the setting with verifiable evidence is also present
in the model with non-verifiable signals. In the Appendix we prove the following:
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Proposition 5 An equilibrium in which all team members report their signals truthfully
exists if and only if the value of adaptation ∆q is higher than some threshold ∆qD ∈
( (1−p)
2
p2
qA|E¯, qA|E¯).
Proposition 5 extends Proposition 1 and the corresponding Corollary 2 to settings with
non-verifiable information. In the model with signals the economic mechanisms involved
are similar to the ones in the model with evidence. However, there exists one additional
mechanism. This mechanism is similar to the subordinates’ incentive to conform with the
views of their superiors in Prendergast (1993), or to the leader’s propensity to follow hard
rather than soft information in Blanes i Vidal and Mo¨ller (2007). Each team member has
an incentive to issue a message that reinforces rather than contradicts the other member’s
signal. Since messages are issued simultaneously and signals are more likely to coincide
than to contradict each other, members therefore have an additional incentive to tell the
truth. It is reassuring that our results remain unchanged even in the presence of such a
propensity to agree.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have provided a new explanation for the common perception that organi-
zations find it difficult to adapt to new circumstances, even while some of their members
are privately aware of the need for change. We have argued that team production may
actually be a cause rather than a solution of this problem. A key ingredient of our model
has been the individuals’ dual task of communicating decision-relevant information and
executing the corresponding decisions. In an environment with incomplete contracts,
this dual role creates a trade-off between adaptation and motivation, leading to ineffi-
cient information sharing and sub-optimal adaptation. Our theory shows that adaptation
failures are particularly likely in organizations that exhibit strong complementarities of
production, view themselves as well informed on aggregate, and have maintained a certain
strategy for a long time.
In our theory we have focused on the influence of strategic communication on the
organization’s ability to adapt. One aspect of our model, that we have left aside, is the
fact that, from a welfare perspective, the concealment of information within teams may
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have the positive effect of increasing efforts, which, because of free-riding, are inefficiently
low. These effort effects must be taken into account by a theory aiming to derive results
about optimal organizational design. We see our model as a first step into this direction.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Part 1 : In accordance with Milgrom and Roberts (1990), let (eˆ1, eˆ2) denote the largest
pure Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous effort choice game when members have the
(common) expectation that the selected project’s quality is q. We first show that eˆ1 and
eˆ2 are continuous, strictly increasing functions of q. Continuity follows from the concavity
of the members’ payoffs, αiqF (ei, ej) − Ci(ei), and the fact that efforts are chosen from
the interior of a convex set. As the members’ payoffs have increasing differences in (q, ei)
and efforts are complements, Theorem 6 of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) implies that eˆ1
and eˆ2 are both non-decreasing in q. Hence, an increase in q must raise each member’s
marginal return to effort evaluated at the equilibrium, and, due to the strict convexity of
the members’ cost functions, must therefore lead to strictly higher equilibrium efforts.
Consider member i’s incentive to disclose evidence as defined by ∆Ui in (7). From the
above it follows that eˆE,E2 and hence ∆Ui are continuous, strictly increasing functions of
qB|E . Consider the limit as qB|E → qA|E. From qA|E < ρ1qA|E+(1−ρ1)qA|E¯ it follows that
eˆE,E2 < eˆ
∅,∅
2 which implies that ∆Ui < 0. In contrast for qB|E → ρ1qA|E+(1−ρ1)qA|E¯ it must
hold that eˆE,E2 → eˆ
∅,∅
2 and hence qB|E > qA|E implies that ∆Ui > 0. Hence there must exist
a unique qB|E for which qA|E < qB|E < ρ1qA|E+(1−ρ1)qA|E¯ and ∆Ui = 0. Denote the cor-
responding value of adaptation ∆q = qB|E−qA|E as ∆qi and define ∆q
D = max(∆q1,∆q2).
Full disclosure of evidence constitutes an equilibrium if and only if ∆q ≥ ∆qD.
Part 2 and 3 : Suppose that dj < 1. The novelty with respect to Part 1 is that when
member j fails to disclose evidence, member i cannot distinguish between the case in
which member j has failed to obtain evidence and the case in which member j has ob-
tained evidence but concealed it. When no evidence is disclosed, the simultaneous effort
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choice therefore constitutes a Bayesian game, in which each team member’s type repre-
sents whether or not he has obtained evidence. Van Zandt and Vives (2007) show that the
insights of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) extend to Bayesian games. In case of a multiplicity
of equilibria we can therefore select the equilibrium with the highest efforts as the Pareto
preferred outcome. Let this equilibrium be denoted as ((eˆE,∅1 , eˆ
∅,∅
1 ), (eˆ
E,∅
2 , eˆ
∅,∅
2 )) where eˆ
E,∅
i
and eˆ∅,∅i are member i’s efforts when he did or did not obtain evidence, respectively.
In the absence of evidence, member i must believe that member j has obtained
evidence with probability γ˜j =
γj(1−dj)
γj(1−dj)+1−γj
and that E has occurred with probability
ρ1,i =
ρ0(1−γi)[1−γj+γj(1−dj )]
ρ0(1−γi)[1−γj+γj(1−dj )]+1−ρ0
. The effort eˆE,∅i must therefore solve the program
max
ei
αiqA|E [γ˜jF (ei, eˆ
E,∅
j ) + (1− γ˜j)F (ei, eˆ
∅,∅
j )]− Ci(ei), (21)
whereas eˆ∅,∅i must solve
max
ei
αi{(1− ρ1,i)qA|E¯F (ei, eˆ
∅,∅
j ) + ρ1,iqA|E[γ˜jF (ei, eˆ
E,∅
j ) + (1− γ˜j)F (ei, eˆ
∅,∅
j )]} − Ci(ei).(22)
It follows from qA|E¯ > qA|E and the complementarity of efforts that eˆ
∅,∅
1 > eˆ
E,∅
1 and
eˆ∅,∅2 > eˆ
E,∅
2 . Disclosure is optimal for member i if and only if ∆Ui(dj) ≥ 0 with
∆Ui(dj) ≡ Ui(eˆ
E,E
i , eˆ
E,E
j , qB|E)− [γ˜jUi(eˆ
E,∅
i , eˆ
E,∅
j , qA|E) + (1− γ˜j)Ui(eˆ
E,∅
i , eˆ
∅,∅
j , qA|E)]. (23)
We now show that ∆Ui(dj) is strictly decreasing. An increase in dj leads to a decrease in
γ˜j and to an increase in ρ1,i. Both effects lead to an increase in eˆ
∅,∅
i and eˆ
E,∅
i and due to
the complementarity of efforts to an increase in eˆ∅,∅j and eˆ
E,∅
j . Hence member i’s incentive
to disclose evidence, ∆Ui(dj), decreases in the likelihood with which member j discloses.
The same argument as in Part 1 therefore implies that there exists a ∆qC > 0 such that
∆Ui(0) ≤ 0⇔ ∆q ≤ ∆q
C and ∆qC < ∆qD. Full concealment constitutes an equilibrium
if and only if ∆q ≤ ∆qC .
Finally, to prove the monotonicity of disclosure for ∆q ∈ (∆qC ,∆qD) note that, for
similar reasons as above, ∆Ui(dj) is decreasing not only in dj but also in di. Hence if
(d1, d2) and (d
′
1, d
′
2) are equilibria for ∆q and ∆q
′ respectively and (d′1, d
′
2) > (d1, d2) then
the fact that ∆Ui(dj) is increasing in the value of adaptation implies that ∆q
′ > ∆q. 
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Proof of Proposition 2: If member i expects the project’s quality to be given by q, then
his reaction function in the simultaneous effort choice game is given by Ri(ej) = q(1+ηej).
Given identical expectations the equilibrium is the unique solution to the linear system
of equations Ri(e
∗
j ) = e
∗
i leading e
∗
1 = e
∗
2 =
q
1−ηq
. Existence of equilibrium can be guar-
anteed for all relevant expectations by assuming that η < 1
qA|E¯
. Normalizing by setting
ρ1qA|E + (1− ρ1)qA|E¯ = 1, we therefore obtain the effort levels e
∅,∅
j =
1
1−η
, eE,Ej =
qB|E
1−ηqB|E
and e∅,Ei = qA|E(1 + η
1
1−η
). Substituting these efforts into (7) gives
∆U1 = ∆U2 =
3
2
q2B|E − ηq
3
B|E
2(1− ηqB|E)2
−
1
2
q2A|E + (1− η)qA|E
2(1− η)2
. (24)
Solving ∆U1 = ∆U2 = 0 for qA|E we can express the critical value of adaptation as a
function of qB|E :
∆qI = qB|E − (1− η)


√
1 +
3q2
B|E − 2ηq
3
B|E
(1− ηqB|E)2
− 1

 . (25)
The threshold ∆qI is increasing in η. 
Proof of Proposition 3: Consider the effect of an increase in the team’s aggregate
informedness Γ = 1 − (1 − γ1)(1 − γ2). Note from (4) that an increase in Γ leads to
a decrease in the likelihood ρ1 with which members believe E to have occurred in the
absence of evidence. From qA|E < qA|E¯ and the fact that equilibrium efforts are strictly
increasing in the project’s expected quality (see proof of Proposition 1) it follows that eˆ∅,∅j
becomes larger. This decreases member i’s incentive to disclose information ∆Ui leading
to an increase in the threshold ∆qI . 
Proof of Proposition 4:
Part 1 : Consider the effect of an increase in the time horizon T . It follows from (11) that
an increase in T decrease the likelihood ρT with which members believe E to have occurred
when no evidence was disclosed over the full duration of T periods. From qA|E < qA|E¯ and
the fact that equilibrium efforts are strictly increasing in the project’s expected quality
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(see proof of Proposition 1) it follows that eˆ∅,∅j,T in (13) becomes larger. This decreases
member i’s incentive to disclose information ∆UTi leading to an expansion of the set B
I(T ).
Part 2 : Consider (16) and note that ∆U∞i is strictly decreasing in ρ0. This follows
from the fact that, in the limit, member j’s effort eˆE¯,E¯j on project A is independent of ρ0
and that the expected quality of the critical project B = (qB|E¯ , qB|E) = (0, qA|E+
1−ρ0
ρ0
qA|E¯)
is decreasing in ρ0. For ρ0 → 1 it follows from eˆ
E¯,E¯
j > eˆ
E,E
j that ∆U
∞
i < 0. In contrast,
for ρ0 → 0 it holds that ∆U
∞
i > 0. Hence there exists a unique ρ0,i ∈ (0, 1) that solves
∆U∞i = 0. Define ρ¯0 = mini∈{1,2} ρ0,i. It then follows from Part 1 that for every ρ0 > ρ¯0
there exists a time horizon T¯ such that BI(T ) = B for all T ≥ T¯ . 
Proof of Proposition 5: Consider the possibility of a truth-telling equilibrium. Member
i’s payoff Ui = Ui,i+Ui,j can be decomposed into his own contribution Ui,i = αiqei−Ci(ei)
and his colleague’s contribution Ui,j = αiqej . We consider both parts separately and de-
note by ∆Ui,i and ∆Ui,j the corresponding differences between expected payoffs from
truth-telling and from deviating. For si = E¯ we have
∆Ui,i = 2p(1− p)[αiqA|E¯,E eˆi(qA|E¯,E)− Ci(eˆi(qA|E¯,E)) (26)
−αiqB|E¯,E eˆi(qB|E¯,E) + Ci(eˆi(qB|E¯,E))].
It follows from qA|E¯,E =
1
2
qA|E¯ >
1
2
qB|E = qB|E¯,E and the optimality of eˆ(qA|E¯,E) that
∆Ui,i > 0. Moreover,
∆Ui,j = p(2p− 1)αiqA|E¯[eˆj(qA|E¯,E¯)− eˆj(qA|E,E¯)] (27)
+p(1− p)αi[qA|E¯ eˆj(qA|E¯,E¯)− qB|E eˆj(qB|E,E)].
Note that eˆj(qA|E¯,E¯) > eˆj(qA|E,E¯) and that qA|E¯ > qB|E implies that eˆj(qA|E¯,E¯) > eˆj(qB|E,E).
It follows that ∆Ui,j > 0. We have therefore shown that truth-telling is optimal if si = E¯.
It remains to consider the case where si = E. We find
∆Ui,i = [p
2 + (1− p)2][αiqB|E,E eˆi(qB|E,E)− Ci(eˆi(qB|E,E)) (28)
−αiqA|E,E eˆi(qA|E,E) + Ci(eˆi(qA|E,E))].
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Note that ∆Ui,i is strictly increasing in qB|E,E and hence in qB|E . For qB|E →
(1−p)2
p2
qA|E¯,
eˆi(qB|E,E)→ eˆi(qA|E,E) and thus ∆Ui,i → 0. Finally, we have
∆Ui,j = αi[p
2qB|E eˆj(qB|E,E) + (1− p)pqA|E¯ eˆj(qA|E¯,E) (29)
−(1 − p)2qA|E¯ eˆj(qA|E,E¯)− (1− p)pqA|E¯ eˆj(qA|E¯,E¯)]
Again, ∆Ui,j is strictly increasing in qB|E . Furthermore,
lim
qB|E→qA|E¯
∆Ui,j = (2p− 1)αiqA|E¯[peˆj(qA|E¯,E¯) + (1− p)eˆj(qA|E,E¯)] > 0 (30)
and
lim
qB|E→
(1−p)2
p2
qA|E¯
∆Ui,j = αiqA|E¯{(1− p)
2[eˆj(qB|E,E)− eˆj(qA|E,E¯)] (31)
+(1− p)p[eˆj(qA|E,E¯)− eˆj(qA|E¯,E¯)]} < 0
where the last inequality arises from the fact that in the limit eˆj(qB|E,E) → eˆj(qA|E,E)
and eˆj(qA|E,E) < eˆj(qA|E,E¯) < eˆj(qA|E¯,E¯). Taken together these results imply that there
exists a ∆qi such that truth telling is optimal for member i if and only if ∆q = qB|E ≥
∆qi. Defining ∆q
D = max(∆q1,∆q2) we have therefore shown that mutual truth-telling
constitutes an equilibrium if and only if ∆q ≥ ∆qD.
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